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,QWURGXFWLRQ
I. 7KHKLVWRULFXQZDQWHGLPPLJUDQW
II. 7KHFRQWHPSRUDU\XQGHVLUDEOHLPPLJUDQW
1. 7KHIXWXUHXQGHVLUDEOHFLWL]HQ
&RQFOXVLRQ

,QWURGXFWLRQ
In April 2018, Canada’s federal government announced that it had decided
“to eliminate” the medical inadmissibility policy from our immigration
regime.1 This was to bring our practices in line with contemporary
Canadian values, and to engender consistency with the &RQYHQWLRQ RQ
WKH 5LJKWV RI 3HUVRQV ZLWK 'LVDELOLWLHV (&53'),2 that Canada signed
in 2007 and rati¿ed in 2010. The &53' requires equality for persons
with disabilities, including taking actions to enable full and effective
participation and inclusion in society.3 To achieve these obligations, states
must adopt legislative or other measures that implement these rights, and
must repeal or revise legislation or policies which are inconsistent with the
&53'’s obligations.4
Canadian law has long had provisions that speci¿cally consider, or
require, rejecting potential immigrants based on grounds that are linked
to health conditions and perceived intellectual and physical disabilities.
Although the announced goal was eliminating the policy, the government
news release indicated that this would not happen immediately. Rather,
further collaboration with provinces and territories was required to
understand the effects of a repeal, because these levels of government hold
responsibility for providing access to health and social services for their
residents. In the short term, however, the federal government committed
1.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, News Release, “Government of Canada
brings medical inadmissibility policy in line with inclusivity for persons with disabilities” (16 April
2018), online: 1HZVURRP²,PPLJUDWLRQ 5HIXJHHV DQG &LWL]HQVKLS &DQDGD <www.canada.ca/en/
immigration-refugees-citizenship/news.html>.
2.
&RQYHQWLRQ RQ WKH 5LJKWV RI 3HUVRQV ZLWK 'LVDELOLWLHV, 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 44910
(entered into force 3 May 2008) [&53'].
3.
&53', LELG, art 3.
4.
&53', LELG, art 4.
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to immediately implementing interim changes to “bring the policy in line
with Canadian values on supporting the participation of persons with
disabilities in society, while continuing to protect publicly funded health
and social services.”5
The Canadian immigration regime has many unique features. One is
that the Minister has statutory authority to grant exemptions unilaterally
to potential immigrants on public policy grounds, where the immigrant is
otherwise inadmissible pursuant to some term of the legislative regime.6
Acting under this power, a new policy on medical inadmissibility was
formally revealed and implemented on 1 June 2018,7 with its termination
date being when the contemplated changes to the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations come into force.
The new policy does introduce some signi¿cant changes. As returned
to below, under the current regime, when assessing a potential immigrant
who seeks to immigrate as a member of the economic class,8 the regime
requires a calculation of that person’s likely use of public health and social
services, as well as the use by accompanying family members. Prior to 1
June 2018, a person would be deemed inadmissible on medical grounds
if they were assessed as likely to have a draw on health or social services
that was above the national average per capita draw, over a 5 or 10 year
period following the medical exam for immigration screening. The new
policy raises the ¿scal medical inadmissibility bar to $19,812/year; that is,
three times the deemed average of $6,604.9 It also narrows the list of social
services that will be included when making the calculation. In particular,
Canada will now exclude the costs of providing a potential immigrant
or their family member with publicly supported special education, social
5.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, supra note 1.
6.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c27, s 25(2) [IRPA].
7.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Temporary Public Policy Regarding Excessive
Demand on Health and Social Services (Public Policy update), (1 June 2018), online: Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship Canada Public Policies <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/excessive-demandjune-2018.html>.
8.
Section 12 of the IRPA identi¿es three classes under which a person can immigrate. They
are the family class, where the key criteria is having a family relationship with a Canadian citizen
or permanent resident, the economic class, which turns on the applicant’s potential to become
economically established, and the refugee class, which encompasses persons who meet criteria for
asylum.
9.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Excessive demand on health services
and on social services (Operational instructions and guidelines), online: Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada Publications and Manuals <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/standard-requirements/
medical-requirements/refusals-inadmissibility/excessive-demand-on-health-social-services.html>.
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and vocational rehabilitation services, and personal support services.
The reason that Canada provided for narrowing the list of social services
was that “these services should…be seen as investments that enable
participation and inclusion.”10
The language of inclusion and participation signals a foundational
shift in Canada’s approach to disability and immigration. It would seem
to suggest implementing a social model of disability. Within a social
model, disability is the product of social, structural and environmental
barriers, which cause persons with physical or mental impairments to be
unable to effectively participate in society on an equal basis with others.11
As disability is the result of public practices, there is a collective social
obligation to address disabling barriers.
Despite this positive shift, the new policy does not completely
embrace a social model of disability. The policy still operates to preserve
and perpetuate some problematic norms and narratives about human
worth. These norms and narratives have their roots in Canada’s historic
practices, which reÀected stereotyping, social stigma, and eugenicsinformed thinking, about what makes a person a worthwhile citizen and
what deserves moral or social condemnation. These roots are ugly. Writing
with regard to the disability provisions, Judith Mosoff observes that “the
same ideological mechanisms which keep Canadians with disabilities and
their families ‘outsiders’ to the bene¿ts of the Canadian state operate in a
more direct way to keep people with disabilities outside Canada.”12 This
article joins the scholarship on how migration law brings social values
and prejudices into high relief.13 It shines a light on how historic logics
continue to quietly inform current practice, and identi¿es and denounces
their persistent and prejudicial vestigial structural inÀuences.14 To this
end, I ¿rst discuss the evolution of the medical inadmissibility regime,
10. 7HPSRUDU\3XEOLF3ROLF\VXSUD note 7.
11. &35', VXSUD note 2 at Preamble. See also Paul Harpur, “Embracing the New Disability Rights
Paradigm: The Importance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2012) 27:1
Disability & Society 1. For a discussion of how the social model of disability is becoming prominent in
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, see Ravi Malhotra, “Has the Charter Made a Difference
for People with Disabilities? ReÀections and Strategies for the 21st Century” (2012) 58 SCLR (2d)
273.
12. Judith Mosoff, “Excessive Demand on the Canadian Conscience: Disability, Family and
Immigration” (1999) 26 Man LJ 149 at para 2.
13. See, e.g., Lindsay Ferguson, “Constructing and Containing the Chinese Male: Quong-Wing and
the King and the Saskatchewan Act to Prevent the Employment of Female Labour” (2002) 65 Sask L
Rev 549.
14. See, e.g., the exposé of race and gender devaluing through the evolution of domestic worker
programs, even when the programs appeared to have developed neutral or objective criteria, in Audrey
Macklin, “Foreign Domestic Worker: Surrogate Housewife or Mail Order Servant?” (1992) 37:3
McGill LJ 681.
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the values that it has advanced, and how prejudices were buried under
what appear to be structurally neutral frameworks. I then reÀect on the
regime that was in place prior to June 2018, before turning to how the new
policy fails the disabled community by continuing to perpetuate a ¿scal
calculus of human worth and leaving the heart of the problematic historic
framework in place.
I. The historic unwanted immigrant
The admissibility of would be immigrants has historically turned, in part,
on matters such as whether the applicant was perceived to have a health
condition or physical or mental disability which were identi¿ed as Àagging
them as undesirable or burdensome citizens. This approach reÀected, in
part, what has come to known as a ‘medical’ model of disability. Under this
view or model, any mental or physical barriers to full societal participation
are taken as resulting from individualized and private de¿cits or defects.
Thus it is the individual who is the source of the problem, and society
may or may not exercise discretion to ‘help’ the individual, with such help
being laced with a scent of charity. A related and overlapping model, the
‘economic model’, makes the costs of inclusion the primary concern.15 Its
focus is thus on supporting people with disabilities to enter the workforce,
so that they will be less likely to draw upon public support.16 These
contrast with the social model, where participatory de¿cits are identi¿ed
as arising due to the interaction of impairments with social structures and
assumptions about normalcy. This approach places the onus on the public
and society to shift their expectations about who populates the polity, and
make decisions and structure society to remove barriers, accordingly.17
Early legislation, which was in place until 1906, squarely reÀected
a medicalized model, and was coupled with a moralizing ideology. It
erected blunt bars against potential migrants who had mental illnesses,
or perceived physical or intellectual disabilities, framed within the
stigmatizing language of being a “lunatic, Idiot, Deaf and Dumb, Blind or
In¿rm Person.”18 The legislation also precluded the landing of persons with
any “loathsome, dangerous or infectious disease or malady,”19 with the

15. Mosoff, supra note 12 at para 6.
16. Ibid at para 36.
17. Tom Shakespeare, “The Social Model of Disability” in Lennard Davis, ed, The Disability Studies
Reader (New York: Routledge, 2013) 214 at 216.
18. An Act respecting Emigrants and Quarantine, CSC 1859, c 40, s 10(2).
19. Ibid.
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term “loathsome” being borrowed from American practice.20 According to
a 1910 American publication, drafted to guide medical exams of would-be
immigrants, a “loathsome disease” is “a disease which excites abhorrence
in others by reason of the knowledge of its existence,”21 essentially coming
down to highly socially stigmatized diseases such as syphilis.22
The bar against those with perceived mental or physical impairments
provided for exceptions under two circumstances that signalled part of
the bar’s driving ideology. The exceptions were if the individual was
accompanied by family who could be expected to provide for them, or if
a $300 bond was posted on their behalf. This second exception imposed a
rather daunting disability head tax, given that the average income for an
industrial worker in Canada in 1901 was about one-tenth of this amount,
a mere $35 a year.23 There was thus an assumption that these individuals
could never be self-supporting, which in some instances may have been
true given the social prejudice of the time, but it is clearly an unreasonable
universalization.
In 1910, Canada began distinguishing perceived mental illness or
intellectual disabilities from physical disabilities. Fiscal concerns also
fell into the shadows, and other ideological concerns surfaced more
expressly. In particular, Canadian law now vili¿ed mental or intellectual
disabilities by imposing an absolute ban on persons who were “idiots,
imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons, and persons
who had been insane within ¿ve years previous.”24 (At this time, epilepsy
was understood to be an inheritable mental illness.25) The impenetrable
bar against those with a “loathsome disease, or with a disease which is
contagious or infectious, or which may become dangerous to public health”
remained ¿rmly in place. Canada also introduced new bars against those
convicted of crimes involving “moral turpitude,” “prostitutes,” and persons

20. Angus McLaren, “Stemming the Flood of Defective Immigrants” in Barrington Walker, ed, The
History of Racism and Immigration in Canada: Essential Readings (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’
Press, 2008) 189 at 195.
21. As cited in Amy Fairchild, Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the
Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labour Workforce (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
2003) at 23.
22. See, Donna Manfredi & Judith Riccardi, “AIDS and United States Immigration Policy: Historical
Stigmatization Continues with the Latest Loathsome Disease” (1992) 7:2 St John’s J Leg Comment
707.
23. “Census of Canada, 1901” (last modi¿ed 19 February 2019), online: Library and Archives
Canada <www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/census/1901/pages/about-census.aspx>.
24. Immigration Act (An Act respecting Immigration), SC 1910, c 27, s 3(a).
25. Ena Chadha, “‘Mentally Defectives’ Not Welcome: Mental Disability in Canadian Immigration
Law, 1859–1927” (2008) 28:1 Disability Studies Quarterly (text associated with footnote 56).

0HGLFDO,QDGPLVVLELOLW\DQG3K\VLFDOO\DQG0HQWDOO\
'LVDEOHG:RXOGEH,PPLJUDQWV



who “procure prostitutes,”26 where both crime and prostitution were seen
as evidence of “feeble-mindedness”27 and thus a mental impairment.
Finally, Canada maintained a presumptive bar against those who
are “dumb, blind or otherwise physically defective” unless a Board of
Inquiry concluded that they were not likely to become a “public charge”
due to having an accompanying family, showing suf¿cient funds in hand
or having a “legitimate mode of earning a living.” This third exception
thus permitted admission to disabled persons who had already learned, for
example, a speci¿c trade. Such scrutiny was not extended to those who
appeared able-bodied on landing, who did not have to refute a presumption
that they were incapable of being self-supporting.
This early treatment showed concerns with contagion resulting in a bar
against those with perceived infectious diseases. It illustrates an assumption
that those with a physical impairment would become a public charge, but
offered such individuals or their families something of an opportunity
to refute that presumption. It also shows unmitigated disdain for those
with mental illnesses or intellectual impairment, or those whose disease
met with moral condemnation from others. The entry of these people was
blocked regardless of whether they had a family to care for them, a means
to earn a livelihood, or the ability to post a bond. Unlike other wouldbe immigrants who, if rejected, could pay $20 to bring an appeal to the
Minister, those who were denied entry on the basis of a loathsome disease
or being an “idiot, imbecile, feeble-minded” an epileptic or insane, had no
right of appeal.28
The exclusion of those with mental or intellectual disabilities or who
had a socially stigmatized disease was divorced from any basis in ¿scal
concerns about individuals becoming a public charge. The simple truth is
that no amount of money was enough to purchase the mentally impaired
or mentally ill, or those with a socially condemned disease, a dispensation
from their social stigma.
There were only two modi¿cations of note to the medical inadmissibility
provisions between 1910 and 1955. The ¿rst was to introduce a bar in 1919
against those who were not already excluded under another listed category,
if they were either “mentally or physically defective to such a degree as
to affect their ability to earn a living.”29 In this manner, the attempt to
name all speci¿c offending conditions, impairments, or diagnoses was

26.
27.
28.
29.

Supra note 24, ss 3(d)-(f).
Angus McLaren, supra note 20 at 196.
Immigration Act, supra note 24, ss 18 & 19.
An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, SC 1919, c 25, s 3.
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supplemented by a catch-all phrase which went back to ¿scal concerns.
At this point, those with perceived physical disabilities could be banned,
regardless of family support. As I have written elsewhere, this muddled
treatment is in part about how stereotypes engender panic. It is also about
the gross devaluation of persons, which was contemporaneously being
fostered by the eugenics movement.30 This movement sought to eradicate
those people who were deemed to have weaker genetic stock. What was
perceived as mental illness or disability was understood at this time to
be inheritable, and often triggered by immorality31 or a tendency towards
immorality32 (which was also seen as inheritable). All of this was drawn
upon to justify the forced sterilization of persons deemed “mentally
defective” or physically disabled,33 and so of course such people would not
be desirable as new immigrants. Health and medical conditions served as
markers to identify morally and physically desirable citizens, standing in
for a combination of ¿scal concerns, wide-spread prejudice, and eugenicsinformed general disdain for human difference.34
Another new element, which has persisted to the present day, was
introduced in 1952. This provision barred the entire family if one member
was deemed inadmissible. Persons with physical disabilities could
nonetheless gain entry if they had family that was already in Canada, and
who also posted a bond on their behalf.35 However, if a family member
was an “idiot” or was “insane,” or had a loathsome disease, then the whole
family was blocked.36 Presumably Canada did not want their genetic stock
taking hold on Canadian soil.
Our prohibitions remained essentially the same until 1976. Labels
or diagnosis could completely determine admissibility, with no regard to

30. For a discussion of how eugenics informed arguments were used to foster support for legislative
reform in the context of sexual sterilization of those who were deemed “mentally defective,” see
Timothy Caul¿ed & Gerald Robertson, “Eugenic Policies in Alberta: From the Systematic to the
Systemic?” (1996) 35:1 Alta L Rev 59.
31. Constance MacIntosh, “Wealth Meets Health: Disabled Immigrants and Calculations of
‘Excessive Demand’” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, eds, Health Law at the Supreme Court of
Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 293 at 303-304.
32. Ibid.
33. Jennifer Chandler, “The Impact of Biological Psychiatry on the Law: Evidence, Blame and
Social Solidarity” (2017) 54:3 Alta L Rev 831 at paras 47-48.
34. For similar assessments of these provisions, see Judith Mosoff, supra note 12; Robert Menzies,
“Governing Mentalities: The Deportation of ‘Insane’ and ‘Feebleminded’ Immigrants Out of British
Columbia from Confederation to World War II” (1998) 13 CJLS 135; Rose Voyvodic, “Into the
Wasteland: Applying Equality Principles to Medical Inadmissibility in Canadian Immigration Law”
(2001) 16 J L & Soc’y 115; Ena Chadha, supra note 25.
35. Immigration Act, RSC 1952, c 325, s 5(c).
36. Ibid, s 5(o).
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cost, availability of treatment, or the severity of a person’s impairments.37
As discussed in the next section, the changes which were introduced in
1976 directly inform today’s legislation, including the 2018 policy.
II. The contemporary undesirable immigrant
In 1976, our legislation was revised. Gone was reference to “loathsome
diseases.” Instead Canada just had a bar for those who were a danger of
public health or safety,38 ostensibly doing away with viewing health as
reÀecting moral character and instead focusing on health conditions as
issues of public safety and well-being. That said, it is notable that the
conditions that have been listed as threats to public health have had a high
preponderance of sexually transmitted infections such as syphilis, despite
the limited evidence supporting screening for syphilis due to public
health risks.39 Canada also stopped compiling a list of undesirable health
conditions or statuses, and instead introduced a ¿scal calculation model,
and with this a veneer of ideological neutrality. Potential immigrants would
now be assessed to determine if they had a “disease, disorder, disability
or other health impairment“ that “might reasonably be expected to cause
excessive demands…on health or…social services.”40 This provision
attracted some litigation. The ¿rst case to challenge the constitutionality
of the provision on Charter grounds was Chesters v Canada (MCI).41
This decision continues to be referenced for its ¿nding that the excessive
demands provision withstands constitutional scrutiny, despite changes to
the wording of the provision in 2001.42
Chesters was brought by a woman with multiple sclerosis, which had
in turn resulted in multiple physical disabilities. She sought to immigrate as
37. Mosoff, supra note 12 at 155.
38. Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976–77, c 52, s 19(1)(a)(i).
39. Canada currently only screens for active TB or untreated syphilis. In the 2015 evaluation of
the immigration health screening program, the rationale for screening for syphilis was described as
unclear. Questions were raised about why Canada does not screen for polio, measles, Hep A and Hep
B, avian Àu, and gonorrhoea, nor seek con¿rmation of key vaccinations, as such screening would
address illnesses with more signi¿cant consequences for public health. Immigration, Refugees and
Citizenship Canada, Evaluation of the Health Screening and Noti¿cation Program: Evaluation
Division (November 2015) at 17-20.
40. Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976-77, c 52, s 19(1)(a)(ii).
41. Chesters v Canada (MCI), 2002 FCT 727 [Chesters].
42. See Covarrubias v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1193 at para
57 and Barlagne v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FCJ 651 at para 63.
The provisions withstood a more recent section 15 claim in Deol v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) 2002 FCA 271 at paras 49-64. However, in Deol the Charter claim also attracted
concerns about standing, as the claimed discrimination was not against the applicant, but rather
the person they were sponsoring the immigrate. The other lead decision on the excessive demands
provision is Hilewitz v Canada; De Jong v Canada, 2005 SCC 57. This decision turned on statutory
interpretation and did not revisit the question of the constitutionality of the provisions.
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that Canada therefore has the right to require an assessment of ‘potential
excessive demands on health services.’ The error here is that this right is
a quali¿ed one. In particular, Canada’s discretion is not unfettered. At the
time the decision was made, it was restrained by the Charter and a common
law interpretive presumption of respecting the values and principles of
international law.49 With the 2001 IRPA, the Act is to be construed and
applied in a manner that “complies with international human rights
instruments to which Canada is a signatory.”50 Third, Ms. Chesters’ claim
that the excessive demands assessment is grounded in the stereotyped
reasoning that people with disabilities will presumptively be a draw on
the public purse, and not reasonably contribute to that purse through
their work, was an important argument to consider, given the history of
this provision. The court’s answer, to assert that economic contributions
were not legally relevant when assessing family class applicants, was
inappropriately dismissive and inconsistent with the fact that the negative
decision was based entirely on cost concerns. Heneghan J’s response
served to perpetuate the problematic prejudices from which this provision
was born, and failed to question the structure of our grounds for exclusion.
In 2001, perhaps in response to the Chesters lawsuit which was on
going at the time, the wording of this provision was changed to remove
the explicit focus on impairments and disabilities. In particular, it came
to state that a person is inadmissible on health grounds “if their health
condition…might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on
health or social services.”51 This was the ¿rst time since the 1800s that
Canadian immigration legislation did not explicitly identify people with
mental or physical impairments or disabilities as undesirable citizens. That
said, the focus remains on draws to health and social services from health
conditions, and not, for example, draws that may result from lifestyle
choices such as heavy smoking or high-risk sports. This is an example of
how the historic logics linger, continuing quietly to shape contemporary
practice, despite their insertion into the regime only having occurred due
to social prejudice and stereotypes.
The process for assessing whether a “health condition” will likely
result in excessive demands has developed some rigor over time. The
current practice involves all would-be immigrants undergoing a mandatory
medical exam, performed by a doctor who has been designated by the
Canadian government for this purpose. These physicians send the results
49. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 69-71.
50. IRPA, supra note 6, s A(3)(iii)(f). See also De Guzman v Canada, 2005 FCA 436.
51. IRPA, ibid, s 38(1)(c). The term ‘health condition’ is not de¿ned.
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of the exam to one of four regional medical of¿ces. The results are then
reviewed by a Citizenship and Immigration Canada Medical Of¿cer. Cases
where inadmissibility may be an issue are forwarded to a Medical Of¿cer
at the Centralized Medical Admissibility Unit in Ottawa.52 The Medical
Of¿cer will “assess the severity of the illness and the degree of service
that will be required to treat it” which involves identifying all anticipated
social services and health treatments relating to the person’s diagnosis,
usually for the ¿ve year period following the exam.53
The Medical Of¿cer then provides an opinion letter to the Visa Of¿cer,
who must assess it for its reasonableness. If the Visa Of¿cer concludes
the excessive demand thresholds are crossed, the of¿cer must send a
procedural fairness letter to the applicant, informing them of the ¿ndings
and the right to challenge the ¿ndings.
There have been three major changes to the excessive demand
provisions, one of which is the new policy. These are all discussed below.
The ¿rst major change was brought about by litigation over how to
interpret and calculate ‘excessive demands.’ After the term was introduced
in 1976, a de¿nition grew out of the caselaw, which was then codi¿ed in
the 2001 regulations. It states that excessive demand is a demand on health
services or social services which is expected to exceed average Canadian
per capita costs over either a ¿ve or ten year period after their medical
exam, or else could be expected to cause a demand which would add to
existing waiting lists.54 This ¿gure was calculated based on the services
or health care that the person would have a right to access as a resident of
a Canadian province. ‘Excessive’ demand is thus $1.00 over the deemed
average demand, and apparently adding one person to a waiting list. This
narrow reading of ‘excessive’ stands in sharp contrast to a de¿nition that
had been proposed, but un-proclaimed, in 1992. It would have found
demands only became ‘excessive’ when they were ¿ve times the average
annual per capita costs.55 Apparently, the lack of implementation of this
approach was due to provincial concerns about the costs they could incur.56
In 2005, two would-be immigrant families, whose applications were
denied due to each family including a child with an intellectual disability,
brought a challenge to the Supreme Court of Canada. Their challenge was
52. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Building an Inclusive
Canada: Bringing the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in Step with Modern Values (December
2017) (Chair: Robert Oliphant) at 9-10.
53. Ibid at 13.
54. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227, s 1(1)(a).
55. Immigration Act, SC 1992, c 45, s 11 (never proclaimed into force) at para 19(1)(ii)(a).
56. Margaret Somerville & Sarah Wilson, “Crossing Boundaries: Travel, Immigration, Human
Rights and AIDS” (1998) 43:4 McGill LJ 781 at 806.
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not about the excessive demand provision violating equality rights nor its
arbitrariness. Rather it was with regard to how excessive demands were
calculated and so turned on proper statutory interpretation. In Hilewitz v
Canada; De Jong v Canada, the families argued the provision should be
read to turn on whether a person is likely to actually draw upon public
social services, not merely whether they would qualify for or be expected
to need them. The Court agreed that the statute required an individualized
assessment that took into account the reasonable likelihood of the
individual using public sources for their social service supports, instead
of, for example, the family paying for a child to attend a private school, or
the family hiring private assistance for respite care.57 In other words, the
families successfully argued that personal wealth should once again play
a role in assessing whether a person with mental or physical disabilities
would be a societal burden and thus an undesirable citizen. This decision
only considered social services because that was at issue for these families.
The Court did not explicitly consider how to approach whether a person
was likely to use health services. Given that the Court was persuaded by
arguments about social services being available privately, or through costrecovery programs, it would seem that the logic of Hilewitz could extend
to health services that are available on a private basis.58
While the decision brought welcomed respite for some, it continued
to perpetuate a medical and economic model of disability and illness,
reducing the potential immigrant to a source of costs created by
exclusionary policies and practices. It turned on whether the family or
the state would likely bear responsibility for subsidizing the individual’s
ability to effectively participate in society or otherwise pay to overcome
societal barriers. This was despite the Court having received arguments
from the intervenor Canadian Association for Community Living, which

57. Hilewitz v Canada; De Jong v Canada, supra note 42 at para 54-57. The case in which this was
determined only considered persons applying to immigrate under immigration classes that required
considerable net worth. Subsequent cases clari¿ed that this individualized assessment was required
for all applicants. See Colaco v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 282 at
para 9.
58. There have been a few cases where parties unsuccessfully argued that Hilewitz applied in terms
of health care costs, including Srivastava v Canada (MCI), [2008] IADD 1574 and Doel v Canada
(MCI), 2002 FCJ 949 (CA). In these cases, the decision turned on the operation of the Canada Health
Act, which requires provinces to provide access to publicly funded health care. The decisions did not
consider the growing prevalence of private health care, which may expand exponentially if parties
who are challenging provincial barriers to private health care are successful. See, for example, the
on-going litigation in British Columbia brought by Cambie Surgeries Corporation, where Cambie
recently obtained an injunction preventing the enforcement of new provincial legislation prohibiting
charging for medically necessary services pending the outcome of the litigation. Cambie Surgeries
Corporation v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2018 BCSC 2084.
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was represented by ARCH, a legal clinic that advocates for people with
disabilities. ARCH grounded the submissions in how the legislation must
be read in line with equality values and the contributions of those with
disabilities to society. They also argued that the accessibility barriers which
impaired persons experience in schools and the workplace are produced
by societal decisions about who to count as its members. However, the
Court avoided these principled arguments to make its determination as
solely a matter of statutory interpretation.59
In its discussion, the Court characterized the history of our immigration
exclusion practices as having long reÀected concerns about limited ¿scal
resources. This rational sounding and measured characterization was
asserted as the dominant narrative of our story of medical exclusions. The
narrative only modestly reÀected how Canadian history also demonstrates
moral and societal prejudices about the type of person who has certain types
of diseases or disabilities. It avoided any meaningful engagement with
the Canadian practice of marking those with psychosocial or intellectual/
mental impairments as Àat out socially undesirable citizens, who ought
to be GH IDFWR excluded. Indeed, as discussed above, the predecessor
legislation did not exclude those with psychosocial and intellectual
disabilities on ¿scal grounds—it explicitly excluded them because they
had such disabilities. Submissions were also made that the Court was
required by the statute’s interpretive provisions to interpret the clause to be
consistent with Charter values, and thus go beyond positioning disability
as something to be viewed in terms of ¿scal de¿cits.60 The Court did not
recognize or speak to these submissions. As a result, its set of reasons
did nothing to displace the notion that potential immigrants ought to be
subjected to a calculus which only recognizes their likely economic drain
upon society and not their likely economic, social, political and cultural
contributions to society, nor their fundamental human rights to not be
subjected to prejudicial discrimination. What it did, rather, was have the
perverse outcome of allowing wealthy families to bring disabled family
members, while excluding families of more modest means.61 This is a
disturbing reÀection of our society’s values.
Following +LOHZLW], when families seek to immigrate and one family
member is identi¿ed as potentially medically inadmissible due to excessive
59. +LOHZLW], VXSUD note 42 at para 42. See also Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter has failed
Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013)
58:3 McGill LJ 663 at para 62.
60. Constance MacIntosh, VXSUD note 31 at 312.
61. Judith Mosoff rhetorically condemned such an outcome long before the +LOHZLW] decision.
0RVRIIVXSUD note 12 at para 40.
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demands, the family is now invited to prepare a mitigation plan for the
government, which in the words of the Ministry of Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada, is to try “to demonstrate that they will not be a
burden on Canada.”62 The language of ‘burden’ remains hurtfully front
and centre. The medical/economic model strips the individual of what they
give to society and family, leaving them as unwanted charity cases who
must refute the assumption that they are an inherently problematic human
being.
In the mitigation plan, the family is to identify the private sources
they will draw upon for support, and how they will afford them. If the
plan is found reasonable, and any likely public costs remain below the per
capita average, then the individual will be found to not be inadmissible
after all—the presumption of being a burden is rebutted. In practice, this
has meant that Canada will only grant entry to those disabled persons,
or persons with illnesses, who can pay their own way. Neoliberal values
have returned Canada to the turn of the century model, which was born
of eugenics and deep social prejudice. Membership in Canada turns on
being a market citizen and economic participation,63 with mitigation plans
reÀecting a personalized head tax.
The proposed mitigation plans are not directly enforceable. There
are two intertwined reasons for this. First, as noted with concern by the
Evaluation Division of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (“ED”),
“there is no in-Canada enforcement mechanism to ensure that migrants are
following their mitigation plans.”64 Enforcement would require addressing
some interjurisdictional issues. To bene¿t from ¿scal transfers under
the Canada Health Act, provinces have enacted legislation to provide
all permanent residents with equal access to the same provincial health
services.65 Thus, a province cannot deny access to insured services to any
person who is eligible for those services.66 Similarly, when it comes to
social services, access rights turn on provincial residency.67 This places the
federal government at jurisdictional arms-length. Although no evidence

62. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Evaluation of the Health Screening and
Noti¿cation Program: Evaluation Division (November 2015) at 22.
63. Valentina Capurri, “The Montoya Case: How Neoliberalism Has Impacted Medical
Inadmissibility in Canada and Transformed Individuals into ‘Citizens Minus’” (2018) 38:1 Disability
Studies Quarterly.
64. Supra note 62 at 23.
65. Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6, s 7.
66. Eligibility for provincially insured services turns on residing in the province for a prescribed
period of time, which can be no more than three months. Canada Health Act, ibid, s 2.
67. For example, Employment Support and Income Assistance Regulations NS Reg 174/2018, s
14(3).
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appears to have surfaced to suggest that families have strayed from
mitigation plans, the ED has expressed alarm over Canada’s inability
to directly enforce them. In a report released in 2015, they suggested
requiring families to post bonds. This practice would expressly revive
our historic disability headtaxes. An alternative, which was suggested by
the Immigration Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association, was to
require permanent residents who entered with mitigation plans to provide
evidence that they only drew from private sources for support when seeking
to renew their permanent resident status.68 If the evidence indicates they
drew on public support after all, then the family could be deemed to have
misrepresented their intentions. Misrepresentation, in turn, is grounds to
revoke their permanent residency status,69 and so deportation would then
follow.
Both existing practices, and the above suggested changes, reÀect a
troubling moral order. Immigrants are already largely selected based on
factors that are intended to predict economic success. They are expected
to work, and so to pay taxes. (Indeed, under another provision, they can
lose their right to remain in Canada if they become destitute.70) However,
some families are welcomed on a promise that they will not seek to draw
upon the health and social services that their taxes are paying for. They are
essentially expected to pay twice, with their income going to personally
supporting family needs and their taxes being given to serve the needs of
other permanent residents who did not arrive with pre-existing conditions
or were able-bodied upon their arrival, and Canadian citizens. If Canada
were to add the suggested bond requirement, then they would be paying
three times. The burden on the individual family is not just an economic
one, it is a moral burden as well. Their presence is deemed legitimate
only insofar as they are willing to exist in Canada as not-quite deserving
citizens. The cost of ‘inclusion’ as a citizen is accepting discrimination.
A second signi¿cant change came about through the 2001 IRPA having
introduced a category-based exception to the excessive demand provision.
Prior to 2001, the excessive demands provisions applied to all would-be
immigrants. After 2001, the provision ceased to apply to persons who are
sponsored to immigrate as a member of the family class, as either the
spouse or the dependent child of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident

68. Supra note 62; Permanent residency status has a ¿ve year term. To renew, an individual must
¿le an application, which includes evidence to show that they have complied with certain terms. IRPA,
supra note 6, ss 28(1) and 27(2).
69. Ibid, IRPA, s. 40(1)(a).
70. IRPA, supra note 6 at s 39.
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'HVSLWH WKLV UHIRUP RSHUDWLQJ QDUURZO\ DQG EHLQJ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK
RXU LPPLJUDWLRQ UHJLPH¶V KLVWRULF DQG FRQWLQXLQJ DGRSWLRQ RI IDPLO\
UHXQL¿FDWLRQ DV D FRUH SULQFLSOH WKH (YDOXDWLRQ 'LYLVLRQ ÀDJJHG WKLV
GLIIHUHQWWUHDWPHQWDVSUREOHPDWLFLQWKHLUDVVHVVPHQW7KHLVVXHZDV
QRW WKDW LW FUHDWHG DQ XQSULQFLSOHG GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKRVH ZKR ZHUH
LPPLJUDWLQJ DV HFRQRPLF LPPLJUDQWV YHUVXV WKRVH ZKR KDG LPPHGLDWH
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the family class in order to overcome their potential inadmissibility.”75
The implication here is that there is something inappropriate about
persons with health conditions or physical or psychosocial or intellectual
disabilities meeting a legislated exemption that is intended to support the
right of family reuni¿cation, a right which is also robustly supported in
international law.76 That said, the suggestion that people may become
married to, or get adopted by, a Canadian or permanent resident to ¿t into
the exemption represents what can only be speculation which is intended
to have an inÀammatory impact. It hints of a desperate interest in ¿nding
grounds to exclude the disabled. Indeed, the ED noted they had no evidence
to support this concern, yet concluded it warranted being Àagged in their
report.
The ED’s commitment to avoiding the entry of burdensome
immigrants, their discursive erasure of the social, cultural, economic and
political contributions of all immigrants, and their silence on the value of
family uni¿cation or the need to be consistent with international human
rights law, echo the Supreme Court’s reasoning from a decade earlier in
+LOHZLW] As I have written elsewhere with regard to the +LOHZLW]decision:
It is hard to imagine the Court would permit such a limited calculation
of worth to be made about a Canadian citizen with a disability….Where
non-citizens are involved the starting point is seen as a choice about
admission, not a choice about how existing members ought to be treated
in the interest of achieving social equality….[N]on-citizens are seen to
be seeking the bestowal of a discretionary privilege, not the recognition
of what must be changed for their inherent social rights to be realized.77

As Àagged at the beginning of this article, the third change of note
occurred in June of 2018. Parliamentary attention had been brought to
the excessive demands provision during a review of whether Canadian
laws were consistent with the United Nations &RQYHQWLRQRQWKH5LJKWV
RI 3HUVRQV ZLWK 'LVDELOLWLHV. While the initial review took place before
Canada rati¿ed the Convention in 2010,78 Parliament did not return to
the issue until 2016. At this time, federal and provincial governments
began consultations concerning the impacts of the provision. In 2017, the

75. ,ELG at 23.
76. The right to family uni¿cation is recognized in several international human rights instruments
which Canada has rati¿ed. These include the &RQYHQWLRQRQWKH5LJKWVRIWKH&KLOG, GA Res 44/25,
UNGAOR, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), arts 7-10; and the 8QLYHUVDO'HFODUDWLRQRI+XPDQ
5LJKWV, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) , art 16(3).
77. MacIntosh, VXSUD note 31 at 313.
78. %XLOGLQJDQ,QFOXVLYH&DQDGD, VXSUD note 52.
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Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration was charged with
undertaking a study.79
1. The future undesirable citizen
The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration tabled its report
on the medical inadmissibility excessive demands provision in December,
2017. It was titled Building an Inclusive Canada: Bringing the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act in Step with Modern Values.80 Through written
submissions and hearing, the Committee was exposed to extensive
arguments that the excessive demands provision was inconsistent with the
equality guarantees of the Charter.81 This position is at odds with the scant
caselaw, described above, which has considered the Constitutionality of
the provision.
It is important to note that 15 years passed between when the decision
was rendered in Chesters and this report was published. During this time
period societal understanding about disabilities and prejudicial stereotypes
has grown. The four year negotiations process for the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) started in
2002,82 the year that Chesters was released. It had the fastest negotiation
process for any UN treaty, with a record number of ¿rst day signatories
in 2006, showing that there was a growing recognition of the impact of
discrimination against persons with disabilities and increasing public and
state support for inclusion. The submissions that the Committee received
reÀected and were informed by this changed context, and there were
growing expectations on Canada, given its rati¿cation of the CRPD in
2010, to comply with it. More broadly, it has been observed in multiple
forums that the rati¿cation has engendered a signi¿cant and generalized
paradigm shift towards a social understanding of disability.83
In its Report, the Committee concluded that while the medical
inadmissibility provision “is no longer explicitly discriminatory, the
79. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration,
Minutes of Proceedings, 42nd Parl, 3rd Sess, No 74 (16 October 2017).
80. Building an Inclusive Canada, supra note 52.
81. Ibid at 22-25.
82. United Nations, “Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD)” online: United
Nations—Disability
<www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-ofpersons-with-disabilities.html>.
83. See Hinze v Great Blue Heron Casino, 2011 HRTO 93. In general see Sheila Wildeman,
“Protecting Rights and Building Capacities: Challenges to Global Mental Health Policy in Light of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2013) 41:1 J L Med Ethics 48; Steven Hoffman,
Lathika Sritharan & Ali Tejpar, “Is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with
Disabilities Impacting Mental Health Laws and Policies in High-Income Countries? A Case Study of
Impacts in Canada” (2016) 16:28 BMC Intl Health & Human Rights, online: <bmcinthealthhumrights.
biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12914-016-0103-1>.
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SURYLVLRQ VWLOO KDV DGYHUVH HIIHFWV RQ SHRSOH ZLWK GLVDELOLWLHV´ 7KLV
DI¿UPHGWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHEDVHWKDWKDGEHHQSXWEHIRUHWKHPPDGHRXW
DGYHUVHHIIHFWVGLVFULPLQDWLRQXQOLNHWKHHYLGHQFHEDVHWKDWZDVDSSDUHQWO\
SUHVHQWHGLQ&KHVWHU7KH\ZHQWRQWRQRWHWKDWWKHUHDUH³EURDGO\KHOG
FRQFHUQVWKDWZLWKRXWUHSHDO´WKHSURYLVLRQV³XQMXVWL¿DEO\YLRODWHKXPDQ
ULJKWV´ZKLFKLV³LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHPRGHUQYDOXHV&DQDGLDQVDVVRFLDWH
ZLWKFRQWHPSRUDU\KXPDQULJKWVSURWHFWLRQV´
7KH&RPPLWWHHIXUWKHUIRXQGWKDWRQHRI&DQDGD¶VREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU
WKH &53' LV WR DEROLVK GLVFULPLQDWRU\ OHJLVODWLRQ DQG WR UHIUDLQ IURP
DQ\ DFW WKDW LV FRQWUDU\ WR WKH &53' 7KH\ FRQFOXGHG WKLV REOLJDWLRQ
H[WHQGHGWRQRQFLWL]HQVHQJDJLQJZLWKWKH&DQDGLDQLPPLJUDWLRQV\VWHP
,QSDUWLFXODUWKDWWKH&53'³FDSWXUHVLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQVXFKDVD
GHFLVLRQ>WRUHIXVHDGPLVVLRQ@EDVHGRQFRVWVDVLQUHDOLW\SHUVRQVZLWK
GLVDELOLWLHVDUHGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\LPSDFWHGE\VXFKOHJLVODWLRQ´
%DVHG RQ WKHVH ¿QGLQJV WKH &RPPLWWHH UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW WKH
SURYLVLRQEHUHSHDOHG+RZHYHUWKLVUHFRPPHQGDWLRQZDVDTXDOL¿HGRQH
7KH\ FRQWHPSODWHG D GHOD\ DQG LGHQWL¿HG D VHULHV RI LQWHULP PHDVXUHV
WKDWRXJKWWREHSXWLQSODFHZKLOHWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWFRQWLQXHGWR
FRQVXOWZLWKWKHSURYLQFLDODQGWHUULWRULDOJRYHUQPHQWVRQWKHLPSDFWRI
D UHSHDO 7KHVH LQWHULP PHDVXUHV IRUHJURXQGHG DGGUHVVLQJ WKH WUDLQLQJ
DQG TXDOL¿FDWLRQ RI PHGLFDO RI¿FHUV DQG DOVR WKH GHFLVLRQPDNHUV ZKR
DUH FKDUJHG ZLWK HYDOXDWLQJ WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI WKH PHGLFDO RI¿FHUV¶
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV 7KHVH UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV UHVSRQGHG WR VXEPLVVLRQV
WKDWLQGLFDWHGGHFLVLRQVZHUHEHLQJPDGHLQFRQVLVWHQWO\VRPHWLPHVZLWK
LQDGHTXDWHRUQRUHDVRQVKDGLQFRUUHFWFRVWGDWDDQGWKDWWKHJXLGHOLQHV
JLYHQ WR WKHVH RI¿FHUV ZHUH LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK JXLGDQFH IURP WKH FRXUWV
DERXWKRZWRLQWHUSUHWWKHUHOHYDQWSURYLVLRQV
7KH &RPPLWWHH DOVR FDOOHG IRU SXEOLVKLQJ ³SODLQ ODQJXDJH´
RSHUDWLRQPDQXDOVDQGJXLGHOLQHVRQ,5&&¶VZHEVLWHUHJDUGLQJPHGLFDO
LQDGPLVVLELOLW\VRWKDWSRWHQWLDOLPPLJUDQWVZKRDUHLQIRUPHGWKDWWKH\
KDYH EHHQ ÀDJJHG IRU PHGLFDO LQDGPLVVLELOLW\ ZLOO EH LQIRUPHG ³RI WKH
¿QGLQJVWKH\PXVWDGGUHVVWRRYHUFRPHD¿QGLQJRIH[FHVVLYHGHPDQG´
7KH\DOVRUHFRPPHQGHGUHYLVLQJKRZFRVWHVWLPDWHVDUHPDGHLQFOXGLQJ
UHPRYLQJVHUYLFHVZKLFKKDGEHHQOLVWHGEXWDUHQRWLQIDFWSXEOLFO\IXQGHG
DQG UHYLVLQJ KRZ WKH GROODU ¿JXUH LV IRUPXODWHG WR DFFXUDWHO\ UHÀHFW
SURYLQFLDOWHUULWRULDODQGIHGHUDOGDWD7KH¿QDOLQWHULPUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ
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of note was to extend immediately an exception to non-citizens who were
already employed in Canada. This recommendation was provoked by the
situation of live-in caregivers,88 who earn the right to apply for permanent
residency for themselves and their families following the culmination of a
several year work term in Canada. At that point, the caregiver is screened
once again for admissibility, and their family members are all screened
for medical inadmissibility. The Committee heard evidence of live-in
caregivers or their children being rejected on medical inadmissibility
grounds after the worker had already ful¿lled their work term as they
sought to claim their reward, due to the worker’s health having changed or
a family member’s health condition. This outcome betrayed the workers,
who had earned the right to seek permanent residency by sacri¿cing
their own family to care for the children of others and for persons with
high medical needs in Canada. The Committee clearly was moved by the
unfairness of this outcome.
The Report’s recommendations unfortunately lack a suggested
timeline to complete the consultations and enact a repeal, despite there
already having been two years of on-going consultations. As well, the
recommended ‘interim measures’ are both costly and a bit contradictory
—if the required outcome is elimination, then it is odd to put signi¿cant
resources into improving the training of the medical and visa of¿cers
who make the assessments, changing how costs are calculated, and also
rewriting manuals and guidelines to make them ‘reader friendly’ for the
public. These sorts of recommendations only make sense if it is reasonable
to expect that the repeal will be a long time coming—or may not come
at all. This is a troubling proposition in light of the Committee having
identi¿ed the provisions as resulting in indirect discrimination against
vulnerable populations including those with disabilities.
The Minister responded to the Report,89 and subsequently issued a
policy. Unlike the commitment that the government made in the news
release, to “eliminate” the excessive demands branch of the medical

88. Recent changes to this program have revoked the live-in requirement. It remains focused on
foreign workers proving in home care for children and for persons with medical needs. See Department
of Citizenship and Immigration, 0LQLVWHULDO,QVWUXFWLRQ&DULQJIRU&KLOGUHQ&ODVV, Canada Gazette
Vol 148, No 48 (29 November 2014) and Ministerial Instruction, &DULQJIRU3HRSOHZLWK+LJK0HGLFDO
1HHGV&ODVV, Canada Gazette, Vol 148, No 48 (29 November 2014).
89. Government Response, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, House of Commons,
online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/CIMM/report-15/response-8512-421-328>.
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inadmissibility policy,90 this time the government did not commit to
repealing the provision. It only committed to undertaking a data gathering
and consultation process to determine the impacts of eliminating the
provision. No timeline was indicated for how long this data gathering
would go for, nor the likely length of time for the consultations.
The Minister did adopt some of the recommended ‘interim’ changes,
including a plain-language review of department “products” and exploring
options for supplementing training. While rejecting the recommendation to
extend the exemption to persons already working in Canada, the Minister
indicated an intention to modify how excessive demands are calculated and
the cost threshold. These modi¿cations were described at the beginning of
this paper. They include tripling the cost threshold, to promote “fairness”
by facilitating access for persons who require health and social services
“at a relatively low cost.” The second major modi¿cation is to remove
social services from the cost calculation, which “are critical for promoting
inclusion” and “[i]nstead of treating these as costs that must be borne by
society, these should instead be seen as investments to enable participation
and inclusion.”
The policy includes two lists which clearly indicate what should and
should not be included when making cost calculations for social services,
presumably founded on the above identi¿ed policy objectives. The list of
services for which the cost is included in the demand calculation is:
Social services closely related to health services:
ƒ Social services that are provided by a health professional:
• home care (by a nurse, physiotherapist, respiratory therapist,
etc.),
• palliative care,
• psychological counseling and
• the provision of devices related to those services.
ƒ Medical aids, appliances, and prostheses.
Social services that provide constant supervision and care for those
who are not able to integrate into society:
ƒ Residential facilities (long-term care, substance abuse services,
etc.)
ƒ Day facilities providing constant supervision (respite care, etc.)91
90. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “News Release: Government of Canada brings
medical inadmissibility policy in line with inclusivity for persons with disabilities” (16 April 2018),
online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2018/04/government-of-canadabrings-medical-inadmissibility-policyin-line-with-inclusivity-for-persons-with-disabilities.html>.
91. Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 7HPSRUDU\3XEOLF3ROLF\5HJDUGLQJ
([FHVVLYH'HPDQGRQ+HDOWKDQG6RFLDO6HUYLFHV (1 June 2018).
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The list of services which will not count when determining excessive
demand is:
ƕ special education services (preparation of an individualized
education plan, educational assistants, etc.)
ƕ social and vocational rehabilitation services (rehabilitation
facilities, occupational therapy, behavioural therapy, speechlanguage therapy, etc.)
ƕ personal non-professional support services means services such
as assistance with activities of daily living (bathing, dressing,
feeding, etc.), meal preparation, house cleaning, etc.
ƕ provision of devices related to those services.92
On the one hand, this list is heartening. The items which are excluded from
the cost calculations are all associated with matters which support enabling
people with physical and intellectual impairments to participate in society.
That said, psychological counselling, respite care and home care are also
key supports, and so it is not that Canada has stopped discriminating, it is
that Canada is now discriminating against a smaller number of people with
disabilities or health conditions.
Health supports, like pharmaceuticals, remain included in the health
care cost calculations, despite medications being necessary for many
people to regulate the nature of their disabilities. So while Canada no
longer counts the cost of supporting a child with ADHD participating in
education, Canada hangs on to the cost of medication which might be
required to regulate the ADHD, so that the child can meaningfully and
successfully participate in education, as well as the cost of respite care
which a family member might need so as to properly support the child.
More to the point, the Minister describes the new policy as taking
“steps to bring the excessive demands policy in line with our values
around inclusion and participation, while at the same time maintaining
the balance between facilitating the arrival of skilled immigrants and
protecting Canada’s publicly funded health care system”93 The message
here is that our values tolerate discrimination on the basis of intellectual

92. ,ELG
93. House of Commons, “Response to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration”
by Ahmed Hussen (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/
DocumentViewer/en/42-1/CIMM/report-15/response-8512-421-328>.
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and physical disabilities.94 Otherwise, there would be no ‘balancing’ to
perform. If our priority was just capping public health and social service
costs, then Canada would also be eliminating immigrants who make
lifestyle choices which can be predicted to likely have health care costs
down the line, such as smokers or obese people, youth who play ice
hockey, rugby or ringette (which are the sports with the highest concussion
rates in Canada),95 women who plan to have children, and any child who
is under the age of one.96 Indeed, anyone who plans to live until they are
65 is statistically likely to come to incur higher than average health care
costs, with the ¿gures escalating quickly to averaging to over $20,000
per year for persons over 80.97 The suggestion of prohibiting women who
plan to start a family, or families that include infants, on the grounds that
they are statistically likely to incur higher health care and social services
costs and thus are a burden on society, would likely provoke a strong sense
of wrongful discrimination in the minds of many. The same suggestion,
when the person is physically impaired on the other hand, leads to a
discussion about ¿nding the right balance—Canada starts with the notion
that a disabled person is a problem. This is to say, the provisions continue
the obsession with preventing those with existing identi¿able physical
and psychosocial/intellectual conditions or disabilities from becoming
citizens, while giving a free rein to those whose live style choices—or even
predicted life span—will likely incur higher costs. The cost justi¿cation,
and the reference to ‘balancing,’ shows the troubling and continuing
normalization of positioning disabled persons as a presumptive category
of unwanted citizens.
There is also a matter of willful blindness when it comes to concerns
about controlling spending. The calculations assume immigrants will
actually receive the health care or social service supports which the
medical of¿cers anticipate them needing. Statistics Canada’s data reveals
that immigrants experience heightened dif¿culty accessing specialized

94. Indeed, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contemplates that it may be permissible
for the state to discriminate against people on such grounds. While section 15 of the Charter guarantees
equality rights, such rights can be infringed if a justi¿cation test is met. That test is a rigorous one. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether the policy would withstand a Charter challenge.
Rather, the point is draw out nuances concerning the policy, and the values and assumptions with it
both relies on and perpetuates.
95. Public Health Agency of Canada, “Concussion in Sport,” online: <www.canada.ca/en/publichealth/services/diseases/concussion-sign-symptoms/concussion-sport-infographic.html>.
96. Provincial/Territorial government health spending on persons younger than age 1 was an
estimated $11,037 per capita in 2015. See Canadian Institute for Health Information, 1DWLRQDO+HDOWK
([SHQGLWXUH7UHQGV± (Ottawa: CIHI, 2017) at 23.
97. 1DWLRQDO+HDOWK([SHQGLWXUH7UHQGV, LELG at 27.
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health and ¿rst contact services.98 There is copious literature detailing the
barriers that new immigrants face when seeking social services,99 primary
health care,100 and mental health services.101 For decades there have been
initiatives to try to counter these trends, but the underutilization persists.102
For the Minister to suggest that Canada needs to watch out for migrants
causing a health care or social services demand crisis is somewhat
disconnected with the reality of structural barriers and systemic underuse.
It once again suggests that unfounded assumptions are being drawn upon
as evidence to support policies that are really about excluding the disabled.
 RQFOXVLRQ
&
The decision to retain the excessive demands provision is disconnected
from the reality of Canada’s experiences when we practice inclusion.
Sponsored spouses and dependent children, and those granted asylum,
have all been exempted from the provision since 2001. No suggestion
has been made that this has placed the sustainability of our health and
social services system into jeopardy. The closest comment to this was the
bizarre concern of the ED, described earlier but without any evidence,
that immigrants who would be medically inadmissible may marry or get
adopted so as to ¿t into the exemption. Indeed, the number of people who
are ultimately declined on medical inadmissibility grounds is strikingly
low. From 2013 to 2016 an average of 361 applicants a year were denied
due to being found medically inadmissible on the grounds of excessive

98. Statistics Canada, +HDOWK DW D *ODQFH 'LI¿FXOW\ DFFHVVLQJ KHDOWK FDUH VHUYLFHV LQ &DQDGD,
by Janine Clarke, Catalogue no.82-624-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 6 December 2016), online:
<www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/82-624-x/2016001/article/14683-eng.htm>.
99. Miriam Stewart et al, “Challenges and barriers to services for immigrant seniors in Canada: ‘you
are among others but you feel alone’” (2011) 7:1 Int’l J Migration, Health & Social Care 16; Melissa
Fellin et al, “Barriers and facilitators to health and social service access and utilization for immigrant
parents raising a child with a physical disability” (2013) 9:3 Int’l J Migration, Health & Social Care
135.
100. S Ahmed et al, “Barriers to access to primary care by immigrant populations in Canada: a
literature review” (2015) 18:6 J Immigrant & Minority Health 1.
101. A Durbin et al, ”Mental health service use by recent immigrants from different world regions and
by non-immigrants in Ontario, Canada: a cross-sectional study” (2015) 15:1 BMC Health Services
Research 1; Mental Health Commission of Canada, 7KH &DVH IRU 'LYHUVLW\ %XLOGLQJ WKH &DVH WR
,PSURYH0HQWDO+HDOWK6HUYLFHVIRU,PPLJUDQW5HIXJHH(WKQRFXOWXUDODQG5DFLDOL]HG3RSXODWLRQV,
(Ottawa: Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2016).
102. For example, in 2003 the author was appointed to Nova Scotia‘s Metropolitan Immigrant
Settlement Association’s “Task Force on Newcomer Access to Health Care in Nova Scotia” as a
project mentor, and then served on the steering committee. Our mandate was to engage in research and
consultation to help identify and address the reasons why recent immigrants experienced challenges
with accessing health care. Several more recent initiatives are detailed in Anjana Aery, “Innovations to
Champion Access to Primary Care for Immigrants and Refugees” (Toronto: Wellesley Institute: March
2017).

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

demands.103 The cost to the IRCC to exclude some 361 people a year
is estimated to be between $800,000 and $1,100,000 per year.104 What
justi¿es mobilizing and now sustaining this sort of apparatus against
would be immigrants?
Part of the answer is stigma and scapegoating. Writing back in 2000,
about Canada’s proposal to require the mandatory exclusion of persons
with HIV/AIDS from immigrating, the HIV/AIDS network drew on the
work of bioethicist Barry Hoffmaster who commented:
…the ¿nancial pressures being exerted on Canada’s health care system
make every avenue for controlling costs appealing, it is not clear how
or whether these pressures would be eased by barring prospective
immigrants who are HIV-positive…
The overall demand for health services in Canada is driven by much
bigger and more powerful forces, including the aging of the population;
the ever-expanding array of expensive pharmaceutical and technological
interventions; the failure of health promotion efforts to have signi¿cant
impacts on behaviour such as smoking; and the expectations of the public
and health care professionals. Genuine attempts to address the perceived
health care crisis should be directed at these forces, and not deÀected by
worries about the ‘excessive demands’ that immigrants might impose on
health care services.105

Excessive demands are present in the Canadian health care and social
services system, and they do require attention. However, their sources
are factors including insuf¿ciently regulated drug promotion and
pricing practices,106 and state failure to aggressively pursue population
health initiatives grounded in the social determinants of health.107 The
externalization of excessive demands—as something which is dangerously
ampli¿ed by foreigners—is somewhat disingenuous.
Costs also arise due to the legacy of decades of discriminatory
practices against those who are impaired. These practices have generated
an extensive infrastructure and culture of exclusion, which is costly to

103. Building an Inclusive Canada, supra note 52 at 26.
104. Building an Inclusive Canada, ibid at 15, 27.
105. B Hoffmaster & T Schrecker, “An Ethical Analysis of the Mandatory Exclusion of Refugees and
immigrants who Test HIV-Positive” (Halifax: The Names Project, 2000) at 20, as cited in Alana Klein,
HIV/AIDS and Immigration: Final Report (Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network) at 57.
106. Ray Moynihan & Alan Cassels, Selling Sickness: How the World’s Biggest Pharmaceutical
Companies are Turning Us All Into Patients (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2006).
107. See for example, Dennis Raphael, Ann Curry-Stevens & Toba Bryant, “Barriers to addressing
the social determinants of health: Insights from the Canadian Experience” (2008) 88:2 Health Policy
222; Jacqueline Low & Luc Theriault, “Health promotion policy in Canada: lessons forgotten, lessons
still to learn” (2008) 23:2 Health Promotion International 200 at 200-202.
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remedy, but for both legal and moral reasons must be addressed. To target
361 immigrants a year, who themselves or their families are selected for
their economic potential, for extra scrutiny on the basis of their or their
family members’ health conditions and physical and mental disabilities,
misses the forest for the trees. As Judith Mosoff put it over a decade ago,
“immigration rules that govern the ways an outsider becomes an insider
reÀect the moral priorities of the nation.”108 Our rules suggest that our
moral priorities continue to be unduly swayed by scapegoating practices
and values that were born in an era of eugenics. They further suggest that
Canada remains comfortable viewing the impaired as outsiders who will
only begrudgingly be permitted to belong.

108. Mosoff, VXSUD note 12 at para 57.

